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Introduction
The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or
"Commission") has adopted a policy (generally known as the "distress
sale" policy)' which allows "a broadcaster whose license has been
designated for a revocation hearing, or whose renewal application has
been designated for hearing, to assign the license to an FCC-approved
minority enterprise" 2 at a discount price before the hearing. By
contrast, broadcasters4 who are unable or unwilling to engage in
distress sales before the hearing may not sell their licenses until the
FCC has held a hearing and issued a favorable decision.'
The Supreme Court in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC 6
examined the FCC's distress sale policy. The Court explained that to
take advantage of the policy, "[t]he buyer must purchase the license
before the start of the revocation or renewal hearing, and the price
must not exceed 75 percent of fair market value."'7
The Supreme Court has recently addressed the constitutionality
of race-conscious federal measures such as the distress sale policy. In
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,8 the Supreme Court held that "all
racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under
strict scrutiny."9 Under the strict scrutiny standard, racial
classifications are unconstitutional unless they "serve a compelling
governmental interest, and . . . [are] narrowly tailored to further
1. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 552 (1990).
2. Id. at 557 (describing policy).
3. See Stereo Broadcasters, Inc. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1026, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1981)(upholding
refusal to allow distress sale after administrative law judge denied renewal application)(citing
Clarification of Distress Sale Policy, 44 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 479,481 (1978)).
4. The phrase "broadcasting" encompasses both radio and television. See 47 C.F.R. Part
73 (regulations governing "Radio Broadcast Services," subparts of which govern "AM Broadcast
Stations," "FM Broadcast Stations," "Noncommercial Educational FM Broadcast Stations,"
"Television Broadcast Stations," and "International Broadcast Stations").
5. See Jefferson Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 340 F.2d 781, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Stephen F. Sewell,
Assignments and Transfers of Control of FCC Authorizations Under Section 310(d) of the
Communications Act of 1934, 43 FED. COMm L.J. 277, 347 (1991). Two exceptions (other than the
distress sale policy itself) exist to this rule: "one allowing seriously ill licensees to transfer their
licenses, the other allowing licensees in bankruptcy to transfer their licenses under certain
conditions." Stereo Broadcasters, 652 F.2d at 1028 n.1.
6. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 557-58 (1990).
7. Id.
8. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
9. Id. at 2113.
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that interest."' Adarand at least partially overruled the Metro
Broadcasting decision," because Metro Broadcasting adopted a more
lenient "intermediate scrutiny" standard.'2 Because the courts have
not yet applied the strict scrutiny standard to the distress sale policy, it
is unclear whether the distress sale policy is constitutional under
Adarand.
If the distress sale policy does not survive strict scrutiny, the FCC
has two significant alternatives. First, it can abolish distress sales
entirely, thereby increasing the number of broadcasters who are
forced to undergo revocation and renewal hearings. Second, the FCC
could create a color-blind distress sale policy which allows
broadcasters who are in danger of losing their licenses to sell their
station at a discount price to any small business, regardless of the race
of its owner. This article contends that the latter policy is preferable,
because color-blind distress sales, like distress sales to minorities,
increase broadcast diversity, reduce the number of time-consuming
FCC hearings, and encourage unqualified a3 broadcasters to sell their
stations rather than continuing to operate.
I
Background: FCC Renewal and Revocation Policy
In 1934, Congress enacted the Communications Act of 193414
which established the FCC.5 Since 1934, the FCC has regulated radio
and television stations, as well as numerous other communications
industries.16 The FCC has exclusive authority to grant licenses to
10. Id. at 2117.
11. Id. at 2113 ("[t]o the extent that Metro Broadcasting is inconsistent with [the strict
scrutiny rule] it is overruled.").
12. See id. at 2111-12 (describing Metro Broadcasting). Under the intermediate scrutiny
standard, benign federal racial classifications "are constitutionally permissible to the extent that
they serve important governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are substantially
related to achievement of those objectives." Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 565. A benign
classification is one that is intended to remedy discrimination or otherwise aid disadvantaged
groups. Id. at 564 n.12 (citing measures providing special assistance to African-Americans and
those with compensatory purposes as examples of "benign" discrimination).
13. See infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (describing when FCC licensees'
misconduct justifies "disqualification," Le., revocation'and nonrenewal of licenses).
14. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-159 (1994).
15. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (creating FCC for "the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign
commerce in communication by wire and radio.").
16 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-229 (1994)(governing FCC regulation of common carriers), 47
U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (1994)(governing FCC regulation of broadcasting), 47 U.S.C. §§ 531-537
(1994)(governing FCC regulation of cable television).
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persons wishing to operate radio and television stations in the United
States.17 The FCC may grant or deny renewal of broadcast licenses18 at
the expiration of a license term. 9 The FCC will generally refuse to
renew a license only if the station has not served the public interest or
has committed serious misconduct.2 The FCC may also revoke
licenses during the license term for certain specified forms of
misconduct.2' The FCC will generally revoke (or refuse to renew) a
license if it finds that the licensee is not "qualified to remain a
Commission licensee."
22
If a substantial or material question of fact exists as to whether a
license should be renewed, the FCC must designate a renewal
application for hearing, and then hold a hearing.' Similarly, the FCC
must hold a hearing before deciding whether to revoke a license or
permit, unless this right is waived by the licensee? The FCC, however,
has the discretion to refuse to initiate revocation proceedings even if
the terms of the Communications Act would justify such
proceedings25
17. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 553 (1990).
18. See 47 U.S.C. § 307(c) (1) (1994)(licenses may be renewed "if the Commission finds that
public interest, convenience and necessity would be served thereby.").
19. Until 1996, radio licenses were generally renewable every seven years and television
("TV") licenses were renewable every five years. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1020 (1995). However, the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 has lengthened the license term for both categories of stations
to eight years. 47 U.S.C.A. § 307(c)(1) (West Supp. 1996).
20. Specifically, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 provides that the FCC shall renew a
broadcast license if (a) the station has served the public interest, convenience and necessity, (b)
the licensee has committed no serious violations of the Communications Act or FCC regulations,
and (c) the licensee has committed no other, violations of the Communications Act or
FCC regulations which, taken together, constitute a pattern of abuse. See 47 U.S.C.A.
§ 309(k)(1)(West Supp. 1996). If a broadcast licensee fails to meet the standards of § 309(k)(1)
the FCC has discretion to either deny renewal or renew a license for a term of less than eight
years. 47 U.S.C.A. § 309(k)(2)(West Supp. 1996).
21. Specifically, the FCC may revoke a license if: the licensee has made false statements to
the FCC; the FCC has become aware of facts which would have warranted rejection of the
original license application; the licensee has willfully or repeatedly failed to operate substantially
as set forth in its license; the licensee has willfully or repeatedly violated the Communications
Act or FCC rules (including rules requiring licensees to give candidates for federal office access
to broadcast time); or the licensee has violated an FCC cease and desist order or statutes relating
to obscenity, indecency, fraud or lotteries. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1994). These rules also apply to
entities with construction permits to build stations. Id.
22. Trinity Broad. of Florida, Inc., 10 FCC Rcd. 12020, 12062 (A.L.J. 1995)(refusing to
renew license).
23. See Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1007 (D.C. Cir. 1966)(citation omitted).
24. 47 U.S.C. § 312(c) (1994).
25. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 3 FCC Rcd. 509,513-14, 515 n.18 (1988)(citations omitted).
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The FCC has held that where "qualifications issues have been
designated against a licensee in a renewal or revocation hearing, the
license cannot be assigned until the licensee is found qualified." 26 It
logically follows that if a licensee (a) cannot sell its station at a distress
sale price and (b) is found unqualified to retain its license, it will lose
its license outright without receiving any compensation.'
II
The Rise and (Possible) Fall of Distress Sales
A. The Rise of Race-Consciousness at the FCC
The FCC enacted its distress sale policy (and other policies
relating to minority ownership)' in order to solve the perceived
problem of minority underrepresentation in the broadcast industry. As
of June 30, 1994, members of ethnic minority groups2 had comprised
almost 23% of the national workforce but controlled only 2.9% of all
commercial radio and TV stations.30
Initially, the FCC refused to consider ethnicity in licensing
decisions. For example, in 1972 the FCC's Review Board31 refused to
consider minority ownership as a factor supporting one of several
26. Chestnut Broad. Co., 9 FCC Rcd. 6141, 6141 (M.Med. Bur. 1994)(citing Jefferson
Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 340 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1964)). The distress sale policy is one exception to
this rule. See Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 557-58.
27. See Cactoctin Broad. Corp. of New York, 4 FCC Rcd. 6312, 6313 (1989)(approving
Mass Media Bureau argument that applicant should not be allowed to sell station after hearing
because decision allowing sale would be "tantamount to holding that any unqualified renewal
applicant will be permitted to assign his license for compensation at the conclusion of
proceedings should he not prevail on the merits.").
2& Policies and Rules Regarding Minority and Female Ownership of Mass Media
Facilities, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 10 FCC Rcd. 2788, 2788-89 (1995)[hereinafter
Minority Ownership Notice].
29. In recent years, the FCC has defined the term "minorities" to include African-
Americans, Hispanics, Asian-Americans, Native Americans, and Americans of Eskimo and
Aleut extraction. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 553 n.1 (1990)(citations omitted).
30. See Minority Ownership Notice, supra note 28, at 2789. Similarly, minorities controlled
fewer than 1% of broadcast stations in 1978, and 2.1% of broadcast stations in 1986. Metro
Broad., 497 U.S. at 553. See also Antoinette Cook Bush & Marc S. Martin, The FCC's Minority
Ownership Policies from Broadcasting to PCS, 48 FED. COMM. L.J. 423, 424 (1996)(noting there
were no minority-owned radio stations until 1949, and no minority-owned TV stations until
1973).
31. Until 1996, the FCC's Review Board reviewed adjudicatory decisions by FCC
Administrative Law Judges, and its decisions were in turn reviewed by the full Commission. See
47 C.F.R. §§ 0.361(a), 1.115(b)(5) (1995). However, the FCC abolished the Review Board in
1996. See In re Elimination of the Review Board, FCC 96-4 (Jan. 23, 1996).
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competing broadcast applications.32 The full Commission affirmed the
Review Board's decision,' but its decision was overturned by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 4 The court
explained that minority ownership was "likely to increase diversity of
content, especially of opinion and viewpoint"' and should accordingly
be considered as a relevant factor?
6
The FCC then conducted a conference on minority broadcast
ownership, and adopted numerous strategies to increase minority
ownership? 7 One of these policies was the distress sale policy.
B. The Birth and Evolution of Distress Sales
The FCC created the distress sale policy in a 1978 policy
statement, in which the FCC stated:
[W]e will permit licensees whose licenses have been designated for
revocation hearing, or whose renewal applications have been
designated for hearing on basic qualifications issues, but before the
hearing is initiated, to transfer or assign their licenses at a 'distress
sale' price to applicants with a significant minority ownership
interest, assuming the proposed assignee or transferee meets our
other qualifications.
38
Shortly thereafter, the FCC clarified its policy by holding that
licensees may elect distress sales "only where no competing applicant
is involved in the hearing"39 and "must explore and resolve the
32. Mid-Florida Television Corp., 33 F.C.C.2d 1 (Rev. Bd. 1972), review denied, 37 F.C.C.2d
559 (1972), rev'd sub nom. TV-9 v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986
(1974). The Review Board stated that because "the Communications Act, like the Constitution,
is color blind ... [minority] ownership must be shown on the record to result in some
[independent] public interest benefit." 33 F.C.C.2d at 17-18.
33. 33 F.C.C. 2d 1 (Rev. Bd. 1972).
34. TV.9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974).
35. TV-9, 495 F.2d at 938.
36. Id.
37. See Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 555-57 (describing conference and FCC policies adopted
thereafter); Minority Ownership Notice, supra note 28, at 2788-89 (updated listing of minority
ownership-related policies). I note that the FCC's policies have apparently increased minority
ownership. See Bush & Martin, supra note 30, at 426 (noting that FCC has not enacted minority
ownership preferences for cellular industry, and that as a result, "levels of minority ownership in
the cellular industry have not approached even the modest levels of those in the broadcast
sector.").
38. Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broad. Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d 979, 983
(1978)[hereinafter Policy Statement].
39. Clarification of Distress Sale Policy, 44 Rad. Reg. 2d 479, 480 n.3 (1978)(pointing out
distress sale inappropriate where competing applicants involved because all applicants have right
to full comparison with incumbent)[hereinafter Clarification].
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prospects for such an assignment prior to, or, possibly, shortly
following the commencement of hearing."'  The FCC did not
explicitly define the term "distress sale price" but a 1980 decision
stated that a distress sale price is one which "does not exceed 75
percent of a station's fair market value." 1 The FCC has further
explained that "the determination of an allowable distress sale price
involves a balancing of the conflicting interests of deterrence to
licensee misconduct and the promotion of significant minority
ownership . . . . [T]hose divergent goals are most adequately met
when a distress sale price does not exceed 75% of the station's fair
market value. '"I
A 1982 FCC policy statement expanded distress sales in two ways.
First, the FCC authorized "distress sales in transfers to limited
partnerships where the general partner, or partners [is/are minorities
and] owns more than 20 percent of the broadcasting entity."4 3 By
contrast, under prior law, limited partnerships could be "distress
buyers" only if "the minority ownership interest in the entity exceeded
fifty percent or was controlling."' Second, the FCC expedited
processing of distress sales by allowing the FCC's bureaus45 (rather
than the full Commission) to process distress sale petitions that did not
involve novel questions of fact, law, or policy.46 By contrast, under
prior law, the full Commission (rather than the bureaus) administered
the distress sale policy on a case-by-case basis.4 7 Where the distress
sale policy is not applicable, "a licensee whose qualifications to hold a
broadcast license come into question may not assign or transfer that
40. Id. at 480. However, licensees involved in hearings as of May 25, 1978 could apply for
distress sales at any time prior to April 21, 1979, subject to the limitation that they could not do
so after an administrative law judge had declared them unqualified to be an FCC licensee. Id. See
also Stereo Broadcasters, Inc. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1981)(upholding FCC refusal to
allow distress sales after decision by administrative law judge rejecting renewal application).
41. Lee Broad. Corp., 76 F.C.C.2d 462,463 (1980).
42. Id. (citation omitted).
43. Commission Policy Regarding the Advancement of Minority Ownership in Broad.,
Policy Statement and Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 92 F.C.C.2d 849, 855 (1982)[hereinafter
Proposed Rule Making].
44. Id. at 853.
45. The FCC has several bureaus that perform a variety of functions. 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.51-
0.131, 0.261-332 (1995). For example, the Mass Media Bureau advises the full Commission in
matters pertaining to radio and TV, processes applications, participates in hearings within the
Commission, develops rulemaking proceedings, conducts studies, and investigates complaints
and other matters relating to broadcasting. 47 C.F.R. § 0.61 (1995).
46. Proposed Rule Making, supra note 43, at 859.
47. Id.
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license until the FCC has resolved its doubts in a . . . hearing."' 4
Thus, the distress sale policy reduces the time spent by the FCC and
private parties in renewal and revocation hearings.49 The impact of the
distress sale policy, however, has been less than overwhelming:
between 1978 and 1995, only 42 distress sales were approved by the
FCC. °
C. Congress and the Courts Uphold Distress Sales
1. Congressional Action
In 1986, the FCC began an inquiry regarding the validity of its
minority/female ownership policies (including the distress sale
policy).51 The FCC expressed concern about the constitutionality of
these policies, 52 and sought to "determine whether there is a nexus
between minority/female ownership and viewpoint diversity, and
whether such ownership is necessary to achieve this goal. "I The FCC
also sought comment on the effectiveness of its ownership policies in
increasing minority ownership, and the social costs and benefits of
those policies. Because a pending lawsuit challenged the distress sale
policy on constitutional grounds,54 the FCC also ordered the Mass
Media Bureau to "hold in abeyance all other pending or future
applications for distress sales . . . until such time as a decision in [the
distress sale] proceeding has become final. "55
Congress responded to the notice of inquiry quickly and
unfavorably. On December 22, 1987, the President signed into law the
FCC's 1988 appropriations bill.' This legislation appropriated money
for FCC expenses with the following proviso:
48. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 557(1990).
49. See Policy Statement, supra note 38, at 983 (citing "avoidance of time consuming and
expensive hearings" as one likely advantage of distress sale policy).
50. Minority Ownership Notice, supra note 28, at 2789.
51. Notice of Inquiry, Reexamination of the Commission's Comparative Licensing, Distress
Sale and Tax Certificate Policies Premised on Racial, Ethnic or Gender Classifications, 1 FCC
Rcd. 1315 (1986)[hereinafter Reexamination].
52. Id. at 1317.
53. Id.
54. At the time of the FCC's inquiry, an appeal to the D. C. Circuit in the case of Shurberg
Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1989), was pending before the
court.
55. Reexamination, supra note 51, at 1319.
56. Continuing Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329
(1987)(signed Dec. 22, 1987), cited in Reexamination of the Commission's Comparative
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That none of the funds appropriated in this Act shall be used to
repeal, to retroactively apply changes in, or to continue a
reexamination of, the policies of the Federal Communications
Commission with respect to comparative licensing, distress sales,
and tax certificates granted under 26 U.S.C. § 1071, to expand
minority and women ownership of broadcasting licenses . . . other
than to close [the FCC inquiry into these issues] with a
reinstatement of prior policy and a lifting of suspension of any sales,
licenses, applications, or proceedins, which were suspended
pending the conclusion of the inquiry.' The FCC obeyed Congress
by terminating its inquiry and renewing implementation of the
distress sale policy and other minority ownership-related policies.
58
2. The Courts Speak
After Congress endorsed the distress sale policy, the Supreme
Court upheld that policy in the Metro Broadcasting case. In Metro
Broadcasting, the Supreme Court consolidated two cases: one
involving the FCC's policy awarding preferences to minority owners in
comparative licensing proceedingss9 and another involving the distress
sale policy.'° The latter case arose out of the attempts of Faith Center,
Inc. ("Faith Center"), a TV licensee, to execute a distress sale. In 1980,
the FCC designated Faith Center's renewal application for a hearing. 61
In 1984, Faith Center petitioned the FCC for permission to transfer its
license under the distress sale policy to Astroline Communications
Company Limited Partnership ("Astroline"), a minority applicant.'
Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. ("Shurberg"), a competing
applicant, opposed the distress sale on the ground that, inter alia, the
distress sale policy violated the Constitution's Equal Protection
Clause.' The FCC disagreed, and approved Faith Center's application
Licensing, Distress Sale, and Tax Certificate Policies Premised on Racial, Ethnic and Gender
Classifications Order, 3 FCC Rcd. 766, 766-67 n.6 (1988)[hereinafter Reexamination I1].
57. Reexamination 11, 3 FCC Rcd. at 766 (emphasis added).
58. Id.
59. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 558-61 (1990)(citing Winter Park
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 873 F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
60. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 561-63 (citing Shurberg Broad. of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, 876
F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
61. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 561.
62. Id. at 562. This petition was Faith Center's third; two other distress sales (both of which
were approved by the FCC) were never consummated due to financial difficulties on the buyer's
part. Id. at 561.
63. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (no state may deny "the equal protection of the laws");
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)(holding equal protection principles also apply to federal
government and prohibit federal denial of equal protection).
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for permission to assign its license to Astroline pursuant to the distress
sale policy.' Shurberg appealed this decision to the D.C. Circuit, but
disposition of the appeal was delayed pending the completion of the
FCC's inquiry into its minority ownership and distress sale policies.6
After Congress forced the FCC to terminate that inquiry,' the FCC
reaffirmed its decision.¢ The D.C. Circuit reversed the FCC, holding
that the distress sale policy unconstitutionally deprived "Alan
Shurberg and Shurberg Broadcasting of their equal protection rights
under the Fifth Amendment because the program is not narrowly
tailored to remedy past discrimination or to promote programming
diversity, [and] . . .unduly burdens Shurberg, an innocent non-
minority, and is not reasonably related to the interests it seeks to
vindicate."
68
The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit and upheld the
distress sale policy. The dispositive issues facing the Court were (a)
whether the Court should apply the strict scrutiny test or the
intermediate scrutiny test in reviewing the policy, and (b) the
constitutionality of the policy under the latter test. As to the first issue,
the Court held that Congressionally mandated race-conscious
measures such as the distress sale policy "are constitutionally
permissible to the extent that they serve important governmental
objectives .. .and are substantially related to achievement of those
objectives." 69 This standard is generally known as the "intermediate
scrutiny" test.7 The Court admitted that it had applied strict scrutiny
to race-conscious measures enacted by state and local governments, 71
but held that Congressionally mandated policies should be subjected
to a more lenient standard for two reasons. First, the Court
interpreted earlier case law to mean that it should defer to "Congress,
a co-equal branch charged by the Constitution with the power to
provide for the . .. general Welfare of the United States and to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the equal protection guarantees of
64. Faith Center, Inc., 99 F.C.C.2d 1164 (1984). The FCC described Shurberg's equal
protection challenge as "without merit." Id. at 1170-71.
65. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 562.
66. See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text (describing birth and termination of FCC
inquiry).
67. See Faith Center, Inc., 3 FCC Rcd. 868 (1988)(subsequent history omitted).
68. Shurberg, 876 F.2d at 902-03.
69. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 565 (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 606 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 565 (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)). See also Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097,2117 (1995)(describing strict scrutiny).
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [VOL. 19:31
1996] THE CASE FOR COLOR-BLIND DISTRESS SALES 41
the Fourteenth Amendment."72 Second, the federal government,
unlike local governments, is unlikely to be captured by minority
interests and used to oppress whites. 73
The Court went on to find that the FCC's minority ownership
policies (including the distress sale policy) satisfied the requirements
of the intermediate scrutiny test. The Court found that those policies
served an "important governmental objective" because "diversity of
views and information on the airwaves"'74 was an important
governmental objective,75 and that the FCC's policies were
"substantially related" to achievement of that objective.76 The Court
admitted that the "nexus between minority ownership and
programming diversity . . . [is a] complex empirical question." 77 The
Court wrote, however, that it was bound to defer to Congress and the
FCC on this issue.78 The Court added that the FCC had considered all
available alternatives' 9 and that the FCC's reasoning was "consistent
with long standing practice under the Communications
Act . . . [because] public regulation of broadcasting has
[traditionally] been premised on the assumption that diversification of
ownership will broaden the range of programming available to the
broadcast audience. "80 Finally, the Court cited numerous studies to
support its claim that minority ownership was substantially related to
broadcast diversity.'
72. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 563 (citation omitted). The Court also relied on the
Commerce Clause, which gives Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce. Id.
(citations omitted).
73. Id. at 566 (citation omitted).
74. Id. at 568.
75. Id. at 567.
76. Id. at 569.
77. Id. (citing Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102
(1973)).
78. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 569 (citing Columbia Broad. Sys., 412 U.S. at 102).
79. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 584. In fact, the FCC had even rejected certain other types of
minority preferences. Id. at 591-92.
80. Id. at 570. For example, the FCC has restricted the number of broadcast stations one
entity may own and has limited broadcasters' ownership of newspapers and cable systems. Id. at
570 n.16 (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 581. For example, a Congressional Research Service study showed that 65% of
stations owned by African-Americans (as opposed to 20% of other broadcast stations) attempted
to direct programming to African-American audiences, and a University of Wisconsin study
showed that African-American-owned, African-American oriented radio stations had more
diverse play lists than white-owned, African-American-oriented radio stations. Id. at 580 n.31
(citations omitted).
Under the intermediate scrutiny test, an otherwise satisfactory
race-conscious measure may be invalid if it imposes undue burdens on
non-minorities.8' The Court found that "[t]he burden on nonminorities
is slight" 83 because applicants have no right to a broadcast license 8
and the distress sale policy governed only a small fraction of all sales
of broadcast stations.
85
Justice Stevens wrote a brief concurrence, which emphasized that
the Court "squarely rejects the proposition that a governmental
decision that rests on a racial classification is never permissible except
as a remedy for a past wrong."
Four Justices (Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and
Kennedy) dissented. Justice O'Connor's dissent, which was joined by
the other three dissenters, stated that federal race-conscious measures,
like those enacted by the states, should be subject to strict scrutiny
because "[t]he Constitution's guarantee of equal protection binds the
Federal Government as it does the States." 87 Under strict scrutiny,
"only a compelling interest may support the Government's use of
racial classifications."'  Justice O'Connor wrote that the FCC's
"interest in increasing the diversity of broadcast viewpoints is clearly
not a compelling interest. It is simply too amorphous, too
insubstantial, and too unrelated to any legitimate basis for employing
racial classifications." 89
Justice O'Connor further found that even under the intermediate
scrutiny test adopted by the majority, the FCC's minority ownership
policies were deficient because the government's interest in broadcast
diversity was not an "important" ° interest as required by the
intermediate scrutiny test. Justice O'Connor reasoned that this
interest was so "amorphous"' that it would "support indefinite use of
racial classifications, employed first to obtain the appropriate mixture
of racial views and then to ensure that the broadcast spectrum
82. Id. at 597 (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 484 (1980)).
83. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 597.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 598,600 (noting only 0.2% of renewal applications involved distress sales).
86. Id. at 601 (Stevens, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 604 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
8& Id. at 612.
89. Id.
90. Id. (noting majority claimed government's asserted interest need only be "important").
91. Id. at 614.
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continues to reflect that mixture."' Moreover, the government's
interest in diversity could be used to support absurd policies, such as
governmental efforts to identify "a black viewpoint," an "Asian
viewpoint," an "Arab viewpoint," and so on 3
Justice O'Connor further found that the FCC's minority
ownership policies failed the "substantial relationship" half of the
intermediate scrutiny test, because "race-neutral and untried means of
directly accomplishing the governmental interest are readily
available."' For example, the FCC could directly require "diverse"
programming,' favor applicants who promised to provide such
programming' or whose backgrounds indicated that they were likely
to do so,97 or enact race-neutral financial and informational measures
to "overcome barriers of information, experience, and financing that
inhibit minority ownership." Justice O'Connor went on to suggest
that minority ownership was not substantially related to the nature of
a licensee's programming, because programming is frequently shaped
by the market or station managers rather than by owners.'
Finally, Justice O'Connor wrote that even if the FCC's minority
ownership policies were substantially related to an important
governmental, objective, such policies unduly burdened
nonminorities. 1' She stated that the distress sale policy "imposes a
particularly significant burden ' 1°1 because it "created a specialized
market reserved exclusively for minority controlled applicants." I
Justice Kennedy filed a separate dissent, which was joined by
Justice Scalia. The Kennedy dissent did not address the details of the
intermediate scrutiny test. Instead, the Kennedy dissent focused more
broadly on the evils of race-conscious measures, and noted that race-
conscious policies defended as benign often are not seen that way by
the individuals affected by them. 'Q
92. Id.
93. Id. at 615.
94. Id. at 622.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 623.
97. Id.
98. Id. (citing Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 593-94). The majority opinion criticized Justice
O'Connor's proposals as impractical and possibly unconstitutional. Id. at 589 n.42.
99. Id. at 626-27.
100. Id. at 630-31.
101. Id. at 630.
102 Id.
103. Id. at 635 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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After Metro Broadcasting, the law seemed clear: intermediate
scrutiny governed federally imposed race-conscious measures, and the
distress sale policy was constitutional under the intermediate scrutiny
test. But five years later, another Supreme Court decision turned the
law upside down.
D. The Supreme Court Switches Sides
1. Adarand Construction, Inc. v. Pena
The Adarand Court overruled Metro Broadcasting by holding that
all racial classifications, not just those imposed by state and local
governments, are subject to strict scrutiny.' In Adarand, the plaintiff
submitted a low bid for a federally funded highway construction
subcontract. The prime contractor nevertheless awarded the
subcontract to a Hispanic-owned competitor, because the prime
contract contained a "subcontracting compensation clause"'
providing that a prime contractor would receive additional
compensation if it hired subcontractors controlled by socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals. 10 Under relevant Small
Business Administration and Transportation Department regulations,
Hispanics are presumed to be socially and economically
disadvantaged.107
After losing the subcontract, the plaintiff sued various federal
officials, claiming that the race-based presumptions in the main
contract violated his right to equal protection.' The district court
dismissed the case, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit affirmed.' Based on Metro Broadcasting, the Court of
Appeals held that intermediate scrutiny (not strict scrutiny) was the
governing standard, and that the contract clauses at issue were
constitutional under that test. 10 The Supreme Court disagreed and
reversed on a 5-4 vote.
The Court held that "all racial classifications, imposed by
whatever federal, state or local governmental actor, must be analyzed
104. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2111 (1995).
105. Id. at 2104 (using term).
106. Id. at 2102. This clause applied, however, only to minority contractors that were'also
small businesses. Id.
107. Id. at 2102-03.
10& Id. at 2104.
109. Id. (citations omitted).
110. Id.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [VOL. 19:31
THE CASE FOR COLOR-BLIND DISTRESS SALES
by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny . . . . To the extent that
Metro Broadcasting is inconsistent with that holding, it is
overruled.""' Under the strict scrutiny test, federally imposed racial
classifications "must serve a compelling state interest, and must be
narrowly tailored to further that interest." Unlike in Metro
Broadcasting, the Court in Adarand did not apply its test to the
plaintiff's lawsuit, but instead decided "to remand the case to the
lower courts for further consideration in light of the principles we have
announced.""13 In support of its ruling, the Court relied on language in
earlier cases suggesting that equal protection analysis under the Fifth
Amendment (which affects the federal government) is identical to
equal protection analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment (which
applies to state and local governments)." 4
The Court admitted that "any departure from the doctrine of
stare decisis demands special justification." 115 The Court found that
such a "special justification" existed because Metro Broadcasting was
itself a recent departure from precedent requiring identical equal
protection analysis for state and federal governments."6 The Court
explained that by holding the courts should treat federal race-
conscious measures more leniently than similar state and local laws,
Metro Broadcasting also undermined other Supreme Court decisions
requiring skepticism of racial classifications and consistency of
treatment irrespective of the race of the groups benefited or burdened
by such classifications." 7 Thus, Metro Broadcasting was inconsistent
with "an accepted and established doctrine.""8 The Court added
that Metro Broadcasting's "application of federal and state racial
classifications has been consistently criticized by commentators""' 9 and
that Metro Broadcasting was so recently decided that it engendered no
substantial reliance.'m
111. Id. at 2113 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 2117 (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 496 (1980)(Powell, J.,
concurring)).
113. Id. at 2118.
114. Id. at 2111 (citations omitted). Some years earlier, the Court had held "that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires strict scrutiny of all race-based action by state and local
governments." Id. at 178-79. See also Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493-94 (1989).
115. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114 (citing Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203,212 (1984)).
116. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2115, 2116.
117. Id. at 2112.
118. Id. at 2115.
119. Id. (citations omitted).
120. Id. at 2115-16.
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The five justices in the majority split as to how "strict" strict
scrutiny must be. The Court's opinion (which on this issue, was merely
a plurality opinion) emphasized that government "is not disqualified
from acting in response to [past discrimination]."' By contrast,
Justice Scalia wrote that "government can never have a 'compelling
interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for
past racial discrimination in the opposite direction."' Justice Scalia
added, however, that persons "who have been wronged by unlawful
racial discrimination should be made whole." It therefore appears
that under Justice Scalia's proposed test, the government could enact
race-conscious measures only if it showed that the beneficiaries of
such measures had themselves been wronged by racial discrimination.
Justice Thomas also wrote a separate concurrence which did not
directly address the dispute between Scalia and the plurality. Instead,
Justice Thomas criticized the dissent and criticized race-conscious
measures generally. For example, Justice Thomas wrote that "there is
a moral [and] constitutional equivalence ...between laws designed
to subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis on
race in order to foster some current notion of equality."'' Justice
Thomas added that as a matter of policy, such "paternalism" l is "as
poisonous and pernicious as any other form of discrimination"'1
6
because it teaches whites "that because of chronic and apparently
immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete with them without
their patronizing indulgence."''
Three of the Justices wrote separate dissents. Justice Stevens,
joined by Justice Ginsburg, wrote both to criticize strict scrutiny
generally and to criticize the majority's rejection of Metro
Broadcasting. As to the first issue, Justice Stevens wrote that
discrimination against minorities differed from "benign"
discrimination because the former type of discrimination is "an engine
121. Id. at 2117. Because the four dissenters endorsed this proposition, it is clear at least
seven justices rejected Justice Scalia's nearly total opposition to race-conscious policies. See id. at
192 (Stevens, J. dissenting)(endorsing "[r]emedial race-based preferences"); id. at 209 (Souter, J.
dissenting)(explicitly endorsing proposition in opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer);
but see supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text (describing Justice Scalia's position).
122 Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring)(citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989)(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)).
123. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118.
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of oppression"' while the latter type of measure reflects "a desire to
foster equality in society."' Justice Stevens added that because the
Court applies intermediate scrutiny to invidious gender
discrimination,' the majority's decision would "produce the
anomalous result that the Government can more easily enact
affirmative action programs to remedy discrimination against women
than it can enact affirmative action programs to remedy discrimination
against African-Americans-even though the primary purpose of the
Equal Protection Clause was to end discrimination against the former
slaves.""31
Justice Stevens also endorsed the Metro Broadcasting Court's
distinction between state and federal race-conscious measures, based
on his interpretation of the Court's precedent,' 2 state programs'
adverse impact on out-of-state residents with no political power, 3 and
the Fourteenth Amendment's purpose of transferring power from
states to the federal government.'
Justice Souter's dissent (which was joined by Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer) contended that the Court should not have addressed the
question of whether strict scrutiny was appropriate, because the case
was factually similar to the case of Fullilove v. Klutznick,35 which
upheld "a congressional spending program that, absent an
administrative waiver, 10% of the federal funds granted for local
public works projects must be used by the state or local grantee to
procure services or supplies from businesses owned and controlled by
members of statutorily identified minority groups.136 Justice Ginsburg
(joined by Justice Breyer) wrote a separate dissent in order to applaud
128. Id. at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2122.
131. Id. (citing Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922 (9th
Cir. 1987)(striking down racial preference under strict scrutiny while upholding gender
preference under intermediate scrutiny)).
132. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2123-25 (citations omitted).
133. Id. at 2125 ("in the state or local context, individuals who were unable to vote for the
local representatives who enacted a race-conscious program may nevertheless feel the effects of
that program.").
134. Id. at 2126.
135. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). In fact, both Justice Stevens' and Justice Souter's opinion stated
that Fullilove was on point. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2128 (Stevens, J. dissenting); id. at 2132
(Souter, J. dissenting).
136. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 453 (Burger, J.)(citation omitted). By contrast, the majority
declined to reach the application of Fullilove to the facts of Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2132 (Souter,
J. dissenting)(criticizing majority's refusal to compare Fullilove with case at hand).
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the majority's apparent willingness to uphold remedial racial
preferences under certain circumstances. "
2. Is the FCC's Current Policy Constitutional?
None of the Justices' opinions in Adarand directly stated whether
the distress sale policy upheld in Metro Broadcasting would survive
strict scrutiny. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court
would uphold that policy, for two reasons. First, four of the five
Justices in the Adarand majority (O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Rehnquist) dissented in Metro Broadcasting." Second, the fifth
Justice in the Adarand majority, Justice Thomas, has fervently
denounced race-conscious programs. For example, in Adarand, Justice
Thomas wrote that "there is a moral and constitutional
equivalence ...between laws designed to subjugate a race and those
that distribute benefits on the basis of race in order to foster some
current notion of equality."' Justice Thomas has also sharply
criticized racial preferences in other contexts. For example, Justice
Thomas has rejected the Court's view that the Voting Rights Act1'
bars redistricting plans that "dilute" minority votes by minimizing
their ability to elect representatives.141 Instead, Justice Thomas would
limit the coverage of the Act to "state enactments that limit citizens'
access to the ballot."'142 Thus, Justice Thomas (unlike the majority of
the Court) rejects the view that the Act may justify "remedial
mechanisms that encourage[] federal courts to segregate voters into
137. Id. at 2135 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens and Justice Souter also made this
point in their opinions. See id. at 2127 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2133 (Souter, J., dissenting).
13& See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547,602 (1990).
139. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119 (Thomas, J. concurring).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994). This statute prohibits practices which abridge the right to vote
on the basis of race. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a). A violation may be established if a group's "members
have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). The extent to which a group's
members have been elected to office may be considered as a relevant factor, although a group's
members need not be elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population. Id.
141. See Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2586 (1994)(reaffirming existence of dilution claims
under Voting Rights Act, but rejecting claim at issue)(plurality opinion); Hastert v. State Bd. of
Elections, 777 F. Supp. 634, 646 (N.D. Il1. 1991)(defining "vote dilution"). Although the Holder
opinion was a plurality opinion, only Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas' concurrence. Id. at
702. Thus, it appears that the majority of the Court supports the proposition that the Voting
Rights Act bars vote dilution.
142. Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2592 (Thomas, J. concurring).
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racially designated districts to ensure minority electoral success."'
1 3
Given Justice Thomas's hostility to race-conscious measures, it seems
unlikely that the distress sale policy will survive strict scrutiny.
I!I
What Next for Distress Sales?
Since the FCC's current policy will not survive strict scrutiny, the
FCC now has at least two alternatives. First, the FCC could abolish
distress sales altogether. Second, the FCC could enact a color-blind
distress sale policy that allows licensees facing a renewal/revocation
hearing to sell their stations for a discount price to any buyer (or at
least, to any buyer controlled by a small business). This section of the
article argues in favor of the latter alternative. 144
A. The Case for a Color-Blind Distress Sale Policy
The purposes of the FCC's existing distress sale policy include (1)
broadcast diversity,' 4  (2) administrative economy, 14  and (3)
143. Id. However, the majority of the Court has been willing to strike down such districting
plans on constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995); Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. 360 (1993). The Court has not required complete color-blindness, but has prohibited
states from relying "on race in substantial disregard of customary and traditional districting
practices." Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
144. A third option might be to enact a more narrowly tailored minorities-only distress sale
policy: for example, one that allowed distress sales only to those minorities who had suffered
discrimination from other broadcasters, or with a proven record of broadcasting minority-owned
broadcasting. Even the existing distress sale policy has approved only three or four distress sales
per year. See Minority Ownership Notice, supra note 28, at 2789 (noting only 42 distress sales
were approved between 1978 and 1995). It logically follows that a distress sale policy narrower
than the present policy would lead to so few distress sales that it would be functionally
indistinguishable from abolition of the distress sale policy, and would have the same
disadvantages as abolition.
145. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 579 (1990); Fifth Report and Order,
Implementation of Section 3090) of the Communications Act-Competitive Bidding, 9 FCC Rcd.
5532, 5576 (1994)(purpose of distress sale policy is to "encourage minority ownership of
broadcast facilities" which in turn "would result in a more diverse selection of programming and
would inevitably enhance the diversity of control of a valuable resource, the electromagnetic
spectrum"); Policy Statemen4 supra note 38, at 981 ("minority participation in the ownership and
management of broadcast facilities results in a more diverse selection of programming").
146, Stereo Broadcasters, Inc. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1026, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See also In re
New South Broad, Inc., 6 FCC Rcd. 5047, 5048 (1991)(referring to "the distress sale policy's goal
of avoiding protracted hearings"); Policy Statement, supra note 38, at 983 (distress sale policy
justified by "avoidance of time consuming and expensive hearings").
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expediting the licensing of qualified broadcasters" 7 Each of these
goals will be enhanced by a color-blind distress sale policy.
1. Distress Sales and Diversity
A color-blind distress sale policy will increase broadcast diversity
by (a) increasing station ownership by small businesses generally, and
(b) increasing ownership by minorities1' in particular. Each issue will
be addressed in turn.
a. Small Businesses and Diversity
In Metro Broadcasting, the Court upheld the distress sale policy
and other minority preferences because "expanded minority
ownership of broadcast outlets will, in the aggregate, result in greater
broadcast diversity." 119 A color-blind distress sale policy will also
increase broadcast diversity by allowing smaller broadcasters to
purchase broadcast stations.
Under the distress sale policy, a station's selling price "must not
exceed 75 percent of fair market value."1" Thus, smaller businesses
who ordinarily could not afford to purchase stations could afford to do
so under the distress sale policy. For example, enterprises organized
by small religious or ideological "splinter groups," or by supporters of
an unusual broadcast format, might be able to purchase a station if
station prices were reduced.
The FCC and several Supreme Court Justices have implicitly
endorsed the idea that small business ownership of broadcast stations
can increase broadcast diversity, by proposing measures to make
broadcast stations more affordable for smaller businesses. Justice
O'Connor's Metro Broadcasting dissent (which was joined by the
147. See Black Television Workshop of Los Angeles, Inc., 6 FCC Rcd. 381, 382
(1991)(noting distress sale "would expedite the inauguration of a new, noncommercial,
educational UHF television service in Los Angeles, one of the nation's most densely populated
areas."); Faith Center, Inc., 99 F.C.C.2d 1164, 1170 (1984)(distress sale would end seller's tenure
"and provide residents of the station's service area with a new licensee whose qualifications are
not in doubt"), affd, 3 FCC Rcd. 868 (1988), rev'd, Shurberg Broad. of Hartford, Inc., v. FCC,
876 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd, Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
148. The discussion below should not be construed as a suggestion that a color-blind distress
sale policy would increase minority ownership more than would a distress sale policy requiring all
"distress buyers" to be minority-controlled. Instead, I contend that a color-blind distress sale
policy would result in more minority ownership than would abolition of the distress sale policy.
149. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 579. See also supra note 145 (citing cases discussing link
between distress sale policy and broadcast diversity).
150. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 558.
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other three dissenting Justices) 15' suggested that instead of creating
race-specific programs, the FCC should have considered "race-neutral
means ...to allow access to the broadcasting industry for those
persons excluded for financial and related reasons."' 2
Similarly, a 1992 FCC order amended the FCC's national
ownership rules to permit a single entity to hold an attributable
interest in up to 18 AM and 18 FM radio stations, and "to hold a non-
controlling attributable interest in an additional three stations in each
service if the stations are controlled by minorities or small
businesses.' In 1994, the FCC again altered its ownership caps by
raising to five the number of small business-controlled stations in
which a broadcaster could own a non-controlling interest without
violating the FCC's national ownership rules.'
Moreover, the FCC has explicitly stated that a link exists between
small business station ownership and broadcast diversity. In its 1994
decision, the FCC stated that its small business-related ownership
rules "will enhance diversity in the radio industry by providing greater
opportunities for minority and small business broadcasters."'5 Even if
a revised distress sale policy does not explicitly require that buyers be
small businesses, small businesses are more likely to buy stations in
distress sales than under other circumstances because small businesses
by definition have less money' and are therefore benefitted by any
measures that make stations more affordable.
151. Id. at 602 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 623.
153. Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, 7 FCC Rcd. 6387, 6388 (1992)[hereinafter
Revision I](emphasis added). An "attributable" interest means an ownership interest significant
enough to be counted against the FCCs ownership caps. For example, ownership interests
amounting to 5% or more of a corporate broadcast licensee are generally "attributable." See 47
C.F.R. § 73.3555 n2(a) (1995). I also note, however, that the issue of national radio ownership
caps is moot, because such caps were abolished by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. See
Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(a), Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat 56, 110 (1996).
154. Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, 9 FCC Red. 7183, 7184 (1994)[hereinafter
Revision II]. A "small business" under these rules is one with annual revenues of less than
$500,000 and assets of less than $1,000,000, including all affiliated entities under common control.
Id. at 7190 n. 56 (citing Revision I, supra note 153, at 6391).
155. Revision II, supra note 154, at 7194 (emphasis added).
156. See id. at 7190 n. 56 (citing Revision I, supra note 153, at 6391 (defining "small business"
as one with annual revenues of less than $500,000 and assets of less than $1,000,000, including all
affiliated entities under common control). See also supra note 154.
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b. Small Businesses, Minorities, and Diversity
Any policy that benefits small businesses by reducing station
prices will also disproportionately benefit minorities because minority
broadcast enterprises tend to be small businesses with fewer resources
than other broadcast licensees. In Metro Broadcasting, the Court
noted that the FCC has "identified as key factors hampering the
growth of minority ownership a lack of adequate financing [as
well as inexperience and lack of information about license
availability] . . . . Congress and the FCC therefore found a need for
the minority distress sale policy, which helps to overcome the problem
of inadequate access to capital by lowering the sale price."' Similarly,
Justice O'Connor's dissent did not question the majority's view that
"barriers of information, experience, and financing . . . inhibit
minority ownership,"'' m but responded that "[r]ace-neutral financial
and informational measures most directly reduce financial and
informational barriers."'" Thus, both the majority and the dissent
appeared to endorse the proposition that minorities suffer from
inadequate access to capital, and would therefore benefit from any
policy that makes broadcast stations more affordable.
Similarly, the FCC itself has repeatedly emphasized that minority
broadcasters are needier than other broadcasters. For example, in a
recent Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,16° the FCC pointed out that
"women and minorities face economic disadvantages when they
attempt to enter the mass media industry"161 and sought comment on
the possible remedies for such disadvantages.16 The FCC added that
"minority broadcasters' initial entry in the industry is often achieved
through acquisition of less costly stations."'" Thus, the FCC, like the
courts, has recognized that minority broadcasters generally have fewer
157. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 593. See also Bush & Martin, supra note 30, at 429 (noting
auctions of communications facilities generally disadvantage minorities because minorities lack
significant access to capital); id. at 444 n.121 (noting most minority-owned businesses will qualify
as small businesses under FCC rules favoring small businesses).
15& Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 623 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
159. Id.
160. Policies and Rules Regarding Minority and Female Ownership of Mass Media
Facilities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 FCC Rcd. 2788 (1995).
161. Id. at 2790.
162. For example, the FCC proposed to allow existing broadcasters to assist minority
applicants, and sought comment on modifications to its ownership attribution rules. Id.
163. Id. at 2796.
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assets than white broadcasters. 1" Because minority broadcasters are
generally less wealthy than white broadcasters, any measure that
makes broadcast stations more affordable (such as a color-blind
distress sale policy) would also increase minority ownership, and might
therefore increase broadcast diversity as well.
2. Administrative Economy
The FCC has noted that by reducing the number of contested
renewal and revocation proceedings, the distress sale policy has
reduced the FCC's workload and conserved the time and money of all
litigants (including the FCC). 6 Because renewal and revocation
proceedings frequently last for years, the benefits of the distress sale
policy are considerable. For example, in Sea Island Broadcasting
Corporation of South Carolina ("Sea Island")'6 the FCC designated a
revocation proceeding for hearing in 1973,167 and did not terminate its
hearing until January 1975.6 8 The ALJ issued a decision in May
1975169 and the full Commission did not issue a decision until July
1976.170 By the time the case reached the full Commission, seven
lawyers were involved. 171 Renewal cases are sometimes even more
time-consuming."7 Thus, the distress sale policy has already saved
both the Commission and individual broadcasters thousands of person
hours.
It logically follows that by increasing the number of distress sales,
a color-blind distress sale policy will reduce the amount of time and
resources spent on renewal and revocation cases. By contrast, if the
164. See also Financial Qualifications Standards, 72 F.C.C.2d 784, 784 (1979)(noting
stringent financial qualifications rule for would-be broadcasters "conflicts with Commission
policies favoring minority ownership and diversity because its stringency may inhibit potential
applicants from seeking broadcast licenses.").
165. See, e.g., Policy Statement, supra note 38, at 983 (explaining distress sale policy leads to
"avoidance of time consuming and expensive license revocation proceedings"). See also Stereo
Broadcasters, Inc. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1026, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1981)(noting administrative economy is
one benefit from policy). See also New South Broad., Inc., 6 FCC Rcd. 5047, 5048
(1991)(referring to "the distress sale policy's goal of avoiding protracted hearings").
166. 60 F.C.C.2d 146 (1976).
167. Id. at 146.
168. Id. at 147.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 146.
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., Pressley v. FCC, 437 F.2d 716, 718 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1970)(affirming renewal of
station's license where petition to deny renewal application filed in 1965, five years before
decision).
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distress sale policy were abolished, every licensee whose license is
challenged by the Commission would be forced to choose between
surrendering its license without compensation and dragging the
Commission through years of hearings.
3. Better Broadcasters
Where the FCC has decided to hold a hearing on license renewal
or revocation, an incumbent licensee may retain its license and
continue broadcasting until the proceeding has been terminated.l"I By
contrast, a distress sale ends an unqualified licensee's tenure and
substitutes a qualified licensee, without forcing the public to wait for a
hearing before an administrative law judge and an appeal to the full
FCC. For example, in the decision upheld by Metro Broadcasting, the
FCC noted that the distress sale at issue would "swiftly end [the
seller's] tenure as a licensee of [the] station and provide residents of
the station's service area with a new licensee whose qualifications are
not in doubt."174
By contrast, where a license is revoked because no distress sale
occurs, the FCC will typically force the licensee's station to cease
broadcasting. 75 Such curtailment of service, although occasionally
necessary, should be avoided if at all possible, because the courts have
held that "a curtailment of service . . . unless outweighed by other
factors, is not in the public interest."'176 By increasing the number of
distress sales, a color-blind distress sale policy would increase the
number of qualified licensees, reduce the number of unqualified
licensees, and (by reducing the number of license revocations)
increase Commission compliance with the policy against curtailment
of service.
173. See, e.g., Trinity Broad. of Florida, Inc., 10 FCC Rcd. 12020, 12020 (A.L.J. 1995)(noting
station owned by disqualified licensee still operating at time of decision, more than a year after
close of hearing).
174. Faith Center, Inc., 99 F.C.C.2d 1164, 1170 (1984), affd, 3 FCC Rcd. 868 (1988),
rev'd, Shurberg Broad. of Hartord, Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd, Metro
Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). See also Black Television Workshop of L.A., Inc., 6 FCC
Rcd. 381, 382 (1991)(noting distress sale would "expedite the inauguration of a new,
noncommercial . . . UHF television service").
175. See, e.g., Sea Island Broad. Corp. of S.C., 60 F.C.C.2d 146, 157 (1976)(allowing licensee
whose license had been revoked to continue broadcasting until October 1, 1976, several months
after decision).
176. Hall v. FCC, 237 F.2d 567, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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B. Arguments Against Distress Sales
It could be argued that despite its apparent benefits, the distress
sale policy should be abolished because it (1) does little to further
broadcast diversity, and (2) reduces deterrence of licensee misconduct
by allowing unqualified licensees to sell their stations at a discount
rather than surrendering them for nothing."7
1. Distress Sales and Diversity
It could be argued that Lamprecht v. FCC 18 undercuts the
"diversity justification" for distress sales to nonminorities. In
Lamprecht, the D.C. Circuit held that the FCC's policy of awarding
preferences to females in comparative proceedings violated males'
equal protection rights. In support of this proposition, the court stated
that relevant data "fail[ed] to establish any statistically meaningful link
between ownership by women and programming of any particular
kind . . . [and that] the government has failed to show that its sex-
preference policy is substantially related to achieving diversity on the
airwaves.""1 It could therefore be argued that just as a station owner's
gender is unrelated to broadcast diversity, her economic status is also
unrelated to broadcast diversity.
This argument takes Lamprecht out of context. Lamprecht
involves gender discrimination which (unlike a gender-blind, color-
blind distress sale policy) is subject to heightened constitutional
scrutiny.1" Under the intermediate scrutiny standard applicable to
gender discrimination, a party
seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of
their gender must carry the burden of showing an "exceedingly
persuasive justification" for the classification. The burden is met
only by showing at least that the classification serves "important
governmental objectives" and that the discriminatory means
employed are "substantially related to achievement of those
objectives. ,181
By contrast, classifications not involving fundamental rights or
"suspect classifications" such as race or gender are constitutional as
177. See Sewell, supra note 5, at 347 (stating policy's "benefits are at the expense of lessening
deterrence to wrongdoing because, absent the policy . . . the licensee could lose its operating
authority outright.").
178. 958 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
179. Id. at 398.
180. Id. at 391 (citations omitted).
181. Id. (citing California v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76,85 (1979)).
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long as they "bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state
purpose.""'
Moreover, the FCC has continued to endorse ownership
preferences for small businesses after Lamprecht.1 Thus, even recent
FCC precedent supports the view that small business ownership is
relevant to broadcast diversity. Indeed, to the extent that smaller
broadcasters are more likely to support programming with narrow
appeal than larger ones, stations run by small businesses may air more
diverse programming than larger enterprises run by women or
minorities.
2. Distress Sales and Licensee Wrongdoing
It could also be argued that the distress sale policy "lessen[s]
deterrence to wrongdoing because, absent the policy ... the licensee
could lose its operating authority outright."1' This argument is
unpersuasive for two reasons. First, even a successful "distress seller"
can "only recoup a distress-sale price for the station" 11 (i.e., 75% or
less of fair market value)1 6 Thus, a licensee may be deterred from
misconduct by the prospect of losing 25% of its station's value.
Second, it is possible that even under a color-blind distress sale policy,
a licensee would be unable to obtain a "distress buyer." This
possibility alone may deter licensee misconduct.
IV
Conclusion
The FCC's current, minority-oriented distress sale policy will
probably not survive the strict scrutiny mandated by Adarand. Thus,
the FCC has two significant alternatives: it can eliminate the distress
sale policy altogether, or it can make that policy color-blind. The latter
option will increase broadcast diversity, conserve public and private
resources, and reduce the number of unqualified licensees, and
therefore should be adopted.
182. Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 23 (1989)(citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44 (1973)).
183. The FCC's 1992 order promoting small business station ownership was issued on
September 4, 1992, more than six months after Lamprecht was decided on February 19, 1992. See
Revision I, supra note 153, at 6387; Lamprecht, 958 F.2d at 382. Moreover, another FCC order
promoting small business station ownership was issued in 1994. See Revision II, supra note 154, at
7183.
184. Sewell, supra note 5, at 347.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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